To a friend

Colijn de Coter - Christ as the Man of Sorrows...

Colijn de Coter – Christ as the Man of Sorrows – WGA5453 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

 

I don’t usually invoke the comparison, because its weight is extreme and its depth is beyond my ken, but it is known that among the qualities of Christ himself this one is listed: “…A man of sorrows, and familiar with suffering.”

 

The infinite joy which must accompany infinite wisdom or enlightenment, and the infinite gratification at hand through infinite power, together somehow fail to provide God on Earth with the merry outlook of a Chesterton or a fool. Our Lord is not a knower of suffering, a comprehender or expert observer, knowing its qualities and results with a scientific precision which we sufferers can only envy; He is familiar with it. It is among his family.

Isaiah stands in Heavenly inspiration before the corrupt King of Israel and announces the maker of the universe not as a man of might, insight, purity, or accomplishment, but “a man of sorrows.”

 

…He had no beauty or majesty to attract us to him
Nothing in his appearance that we should desire him
Like one from whom men hide their faces
He was condemned, and we esteemed him not…
But He was crushed for our iniquities
He was pierced for our transgressions
The punishment that brought us peace was upon him
And by his wounds we are healed.

 

My memory carries these lines, perhaps in error, but certainly in adoration. Somewhere in Isaiah 53 the Lord drew closer to me than I ever dared draw close to Him. God may as well have betrayed a fondness for horseradish or for Black Sabbath’s early work or for Mongolian beef with green onions, shared with my own loves, as so described Himself through his prophet in the distant millennia. In walking the Earth as a man of sorrows, he has offered every man of sorrows a kinship at which every man of laughter should weep with envy. He has extended a comfort our way, in the form of His inestimable wisdom’s confirmation of our own emotional conclusion: that to love is to hurt. He only adds the insight which entirely upends the impulse of our sufferings: If to love is to hurt, then inevitably to hurt for love is the only means by which a man can give his beloved its due.

 

No man properly loves America who does not lament its decline. Aurelius could not be said to love Rome until Aurelius could properly be said to despise Rome, that is, the Rome he saw before him as a betrayal of the Rome that was or might have been. Nobody can truly adore Jefferson except his creator, who saw the moment at which that genius could have extinguished not only aristocracy but slavery at a single blow…and saw the moment slip away. Nobody who rejoices over an Earthly thing as it is really loves it; the true lover of life can be recognized by his tears.

 

I once said to myself that to love a thing is only to really see it; that we do not love trees because we do not comprehend trees, and that the love of a botanist for a tree is the closest we have come to the rightful adoration a man owes the miracle of growth and strength we see in every sycamore and sapling. I meant that the vistas of learning available to every specialized study, no matter how specialized, were sufficiently enormous to fully justify a lifetime of study and interest; yet we non-specialists casually dismissed such matters with a refusal to fully investigate the infinite depth of mystery available in every grain of sand. And every one of these hidden, yet vast, fields of learning fully justified the total absorption which we would see in an academic who had made it his life’s work. I still believe this sentiment.

 

Loss, mortality, disappointment, failure. The griefs of Man echo the griefs of God. The virtuous powers of a man (though not their sinful imitations) to grieve are also his powers to emulate the way that God loves us, and loves all the world. God loves humanity the way a parent loves a profligate child who is in and out of rehab, opportunities lost, gifts squandered, only to re-emerge and then once again be crushed and then once again sincerely hoped for. The hopelessness and hope of that situation, at each repetition seeming new yet once again seeming the same and doomed to the same outcome…How could God yet love us? With sorrow, that is how. He yet once again puts his faith in us. He yet once again puts His broken heart back together, while a greater intellect than we can even conceive considers our history of faithlessness. He accepts us back again through a hedge of rationality that makes you or i look like nothing but an id. And you and i have a rationality, and a sadness sufficient to crush a million others.

 

If sorrow is a major quality of Christ, then to grieve is to act virtuously, for virtue means nothing else but the practice of the qualities of God.

 

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Management and incentive [explicit version]

…This notion of incentive as a recruiter of Man’s god-like abilities is highly foreign to modern management and regulation, because the notion of Man as anything more than a pawn or cog in a machine is foreign to the modern mind.  My manager would likely answer the above paragraph by saying “But, when you order a man around you get better results than if you left him to do as he pleased!”  Which is of course perfectly true, in the sense that you don’t like what he does on his own as much as you like what he does when he obeys.  I say the opposite; but then, I say filling out his TPS reports, serving with a smile, using the specified phone greeting, acting like the firm is a family (that doesn’t love each other), etc. is a bunch of horseshit.  These things are the perks managers think they can get from employees for free after they have done their actual jobs and earned their actual wage.  I have some suspicions as to why a manager prefers to have his employees do the best thing the manager knows how to do, rather than the best they know, which in almost every case is actually the better way.  Some actually believe their “best practices” are superior to the skills honed by diligent, independent work.  Some feel their superiority over their employees so natural that anything the manager’s will directs is perceived as superior to anything the employee’s will is capable of directing.  Some actually demand inefficiency, to increase their own apparent necessity and importance.  Some feel vaguely that the employee/employer relationship must not be allowed to approach a negotiation among equals; it must never have the quality of “I’ll give you $20 to turn these rotors and replace these brake pads,” but must instead always be “You do whatever I say for 8 hours and I’ll give you $96”.  This type of manager feels the fact that he has the superior negotiating position, he perceives the possibility of pushing the amount of labor higher without increasing the wage.  If wages were continually re-negotiated, the hourly wage would offer no benefit to employers (compared to piecework), but in our modern long-term fixed scheme of wages, he is able to lock in a set hourly rate for the level of labor the worker expects to provide, then continually direct his efforts towards increasing labor provided beyond that amount.  And of course the amount of labor provided was in no way part of the negotiation, is no way contractually fixed.  It may be increased indefinitely without altering compensation in the least.  In short, the employer imagines he can get a better deal out of hourly work than he can out of piecework even if the cost and average productivity are initially identical.  If an employee can produce exactly 4 widgets in an 8 hour day, it seems to make little difference whether he is paid $10/hour or $20/widget, yet the first formula is overwhelmingly the one preferred by employers.  And why would that be?  From an incentives standpoint, $20/widget will costlessly tend to increase productivity, as every effort the employee can make to increase his daily production will be naturally found out and exploited by the employee (or any employee I have ever known, anyhow) in order to increase his own compensation, resulting in increased productivity.  Any improvement to production which is known to management and unknown to the employee will likewise be wholeheartedly adopted, rather than having to be enforced by oversight and discipline.  Of course this advantage is totally foregone by the incompetent bumbling wasteful spineless worthless pile of steaming maggot-ridden parasite shit we call modern management.  And why would that be?  Because managers imagine that they will be more successful at uncovering ways to speed production and improve process than will all the specialists carefully working their own machines or workstations will be.  They imagine that their own lofty intellect is so great that they will be able to capture all the advantages of incentivized efficiency-seeking without having to pay for incentives.  They think that they, at their desk, will more quickly find out that you can detect a vacuum leak with a spray of carb cleaner, than the techs will find it out in the field with the can of carb cleaner at hand.  They expect to invent every time-saving shortcut and reliable solution that will be found by a thousand intelligences working continually to find such things.  And for this reason, they refuse to pay for piecework: the manager will do the innovating for free.  Of course the opposite force is at work as well; fixed hourly wage is an incentive (to the employee) for maximizing hours per unit of production, a thing identical to minimizing production per hour.  Thus, where this incentive gains a foothold, the workplace becomes a struggle between the manager’s efforts to drive the employees towards production without incentivizing them with pay proportional to productivity, and the workers’ efforts to evade the manager and minimize their labor while maximizing their time.  This is what is known as the world deciding to waste effort, lives, and time, because it thinks it is so clever it need not extract its head from its asshole.  In sum, managers are the last believers in Marx’s theory of exploitation, and they intend to make the most of it.

A smart, ruthless bastard in Russia is laughing right now

So quickly considering how the situation in Syria has changed recently:

After the brazen gas attack in Damascus recently made it plain that the Assad regime was indeed using chemical weapons in defiance of international law, Obama was reluctantly drawn into rolling closer to military action against Assad. Our general policy of supplying the rebels and generally resisting and opposing Assad seemed justified in light of him being confirmed as a user of illegal methods. But of course a war-weary public in America is not behind Obama on this, and in this matter Congress is uncharacteristically representative.

In this situation (and this is the briefest summary) Russia rushed in with a proposal to avoid a bombing or invasion by the alternative course of having Assad’s chemical weapons turned over or placed under some sort of international control. Russian diplomats are adamant that military intervention be avoided at all cost, mindful perhaps of the temptation of escalation. I don’t mean to say that Russia’s concerns are altruistic; Syria is Russia’s ally, and they have any number of reasons for not wanting it transformed into an Iraq.

This proposal, to pursue chemical disarmament instead of regime change, has been hailed on all sides as a win-win, with the only reservation being Obama’s concern that it might not be genuine or might not be enforced.  Obama is to be allowed to save face even if Congress really does refuse to authorize his airstrikes. Russian diplomacy is to be seen as successfully preventing the invasion of its ally. Assad is to avoid Saddam Hussein’s fate. The Syrian opposition (and Israel) are to enjoy relief from the threat of Assad’s chemical arsenal. But there is an entirely different angle to consider: Through this proposal, which was made possible only though the publicity of Assad’s chemical warfare, has transformed the debate from one where Assad must be ousted to one where this will not even be considered. His throne has been made entirely secure against external forces, because he gassed civilians in front of all the world. Such indifference to regime change was impossible until he committed a specific atrocity, which captured the attention of the world and actually distracted from its perpetrator.

In this case, our interventionist foreign policy has provided an incentive for the use of chemical weapons, and thus their possession. Had Assad killed all those people with conventional artillery (as he has done to other people far more numerous) he would have not violated international law and provoked its special concern. Had he not invoked this taboo, he would not have been able to appease his enemies so easily. The gas attack in Damascus was brazen and obvious because it was intended to be known; he has actually strengthened his position in the international community by violating its laws. We are so obsessed, and so willing to be distracted by, proliferation of these particular weapons of massacre that we are willing to let this topic trump our interest in the tyrants really responsible.

One would imagine that all the other minor dictators are currently considering the acquisition of some nerve gas, in case they ever need something to distract the US. “I’ll be able to slaughter anyone I want, and if it ever comes to the threat of invasion I’ll just gas somebody and then offer to give up my WMD’s!” Russia has invented a new way to manipulate international opinion and the American military, and we’ve walked right into it.

Russian and American diplomats are going to go into negotiations to determine whether this proposal will be put to Assad in the form of an ultimatum or a toothless demand; in reality this is merely a show of compromise, the Russian objectives are already entirely secured. If the resolution is toothless, all for the better. If it must be given teeth (in the form of some consequences for non-compliance) it will only be a trivial price to pay for the evaporation of American commitment to regime change in Syria. Only the Russians must appear to fight against this so that it may appear as a victory to American eyes even as it brings about all of what Russia wanted, and none of what we did.

Woodrow Wilson, John Maynard Keynes, Barack Obama (Pt. 1)

It was none other than John Maynard Keynes, architect of the great mass of current economic policy (whose success we presently so enjoy) who recounted with most vivid clarity what he called “The collapse of The President,” or the remarkable translation of Wilson’s idealistic Fourteen Points into the monstrosity of cynical politics that actually became the policy of the world towards conquered Germany: The Treaty of Versailles. I can do no better than to quote Keynes directly:

When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige and a moral influence throughout the world unequaled in history. His bold and measured words carried to the peoples of Europe above and beyond the voices of their own politicians. The enemy peoples trusted him to carry out the compact he had made with them; and the Allied peoples acknowledged him not as a victor only but almost as a prophet. In addition to this moral influence the realities of power were in his hands. The American armies were at the height of their numbers, discipline, and equipment. Europe was in complete dependence on the food supplies of the United States; and financially she was even more absolutely at their mercy. Europe not only already owed the United States more than she could pay; but only a large measure of further assistance could save her from starvation and bankruptcy. Never had a philosopher held such weapons wherewith to bind the princes of this world. How the crowds of the European capitals pressed about the carriage of the President! With what curiosity, anxiety, and hope we sought a glimpse of the features and bearing of the man of destiny who, coming from the West, was to bring healing to the wounds of the ancient parent of his civilization and lay for us the foundations of the future.

But of course we know how all that ended, or we should, for it ends in the Nazi VI army parading under the Arc de Triomphe. Wilson’s great advantages over all the rulers of Europe would lead one to expect Wilson to shape the peace almost to his whim. Yet when we consider the vicious outburst of crushed pride that was German Fascism, we must immediately turn our eyes to the instrument by which it was crushed: The Versailles treaty itself. With its extractions and restrictions, its violations of national identity and impossible demands, Versailles was remarkable not for its idealism, but for its worldliness; it is as if the monarchies decided to revive and exaggerate the ancient custom of torturing their defeated enemies. Versailles was not merely a practical compromise that secured the greater good through the means of satisfying some petty desires of the politicians, but the very reverse: The political aims of the French leaders were achieved by cynically disguising them as the interests of the whole world. The guise was all the more perfect because the chief actor was entirely sincere: In the charade of securing French power and calling it a Better World, Wilson actually believed that the council was, in the main, making a reality of the Fourteen Points. How could a man be so deceived?

The manifest differences between what the surrendering Germans were promised and what they received were so great and so obvious that the whole of that nation, from ruler to ditch-digger, was conscious of its oppression and united in their resentment and revenge. How could Wilson fail to see what was known to every smirking politician surrounding him, and recognized by every untutored clod in Germany? It is on this very topic that Keynes’s intuitive powers really come to our aid, for his vision of the the “Collapse” is really remarkable, if we can trust his understanding. He describes the way Wilson was gradually, by his own tendencies and the efforts of the French and English diplomats, gradually isolated from his supporters and increasingly closeted with Clemenceau and Loyd George, and perpetually cornered into a position of resistance, for he had not come to the conference with any concrete plan but only the grand general vision of the Fourteen Points. Every practical proposal was drawn from the highly specific plans of the French and English, and in general tended towards the more Realpolitik attitudes of those nations’ leaders, who had themselves expected to be forced to compromise with some over-idealistic scheme proposed by Wilson. But no such scheme existed, and so Wilson was ever in the position of recalcitrant, never able to truly gain by compromise, for his program had no trivialities to trade away for concessions, because he had no program. This was not an insurmountable difficulty of course, as Keynes had already mentioned the absolute indebtedness and physical dependence of Europe on the United States; this factor alone would have been enough for a much less subtle diplomat to overcome any number of tactical errors. Had Andrew Jackson been at Versailles instead of Woodrow Wilson, he would have failed just as thoroughly at matching the diplomatic skills of the Europeans. He would have failed to comprehend the French subtleties, sharing the insensibility to his environment and the character of the men around him with which Keynes faults Wilson. But at some point in the conference Jackson would have looked across and Clemenceau, and told his interpreter to notify the French leader that if he wished to disregard the terms which the United States had offered Germany to induce her to quit destroying France, what right did France have to claim benefits from that surrender? And at any rate any objection to the American program was also an objection to American assistance, and for all Jackson would care, France could damn well starve. But that is a speculative aside; if Jackson was not the type to be lured into compromising on the Fourteen Points, it is because he was not the type to have ever produced them. It was the same moral scruples that made Wilson’s vision for the world so bright and pure that doomed that vision to be butchered at the conference table, and for this reason even a lesser man than Wilson could have been a better man to defend, though a worse man to conceive, Wilson’s Better World. What then happened to the actual defender of idealistic peace?

The President’s attitude to his colleagues had now become: I want to meet you so far as I can; I see your difficulties and I should like to be able to agree to what you propose; but I can do nothing that is not just and right, and you must first of all show me that what you want does really fall within the words of the pronouncements which are binding on me. Then began the weaving of that web of sophistry and Jesuitical exegesis that was finally to clothe with insincerity the language and substance of the whole Treaty. The word was issued to the witches of all Paris:

Fair is foul, and foul is fair,
Hover through the fog and filthy air.

The subtlest sophisters and most hypocritical draftsmen were set to work, and produced many ingenious exercises which might have deceived for more than an hour a cleverer man than the President.

Thus instead of saying that German-Austria is prohibited from uniting with Germany except by leave of France (which would be inconsistent with the principle of self-determination), the Treaty, with delicate draftsmanship, states that “Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may be fixed in a Treaty between that State and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations,” which sounds, but is not, quite different. And who knows but that the President forgot that another part of the Treaty provides that for this purpose the Council of the League must be unanimous.

Instead of giving Danzig to Poland, the Treaty establishes Danzig as a “Free” City, but includes this “Free” City within the Polish Customs frontier, entrusts to Poland the control of the river and railway system, and provides that “the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad.”

In placing the river system of Germany under foreign control, the Treaty speaks of declaring international those “river systems which naturally provide more than one State with access to the sea, with or without transhipment from one vessel to another.”

Such instances could be multiplied. The honest and intelligible purpose of French policy, to limit the population of Germany and weaken her economic system, is clothed, for the President’s sake, in the august language of freedom and international equality.

I love the expressiveness of that image, of the “witches of Paris” being summoned to conceal from Wilson the reality of what he was doing. Of course what Keynes is referring to is the whole body of intellectual power, artistry of words and thought, the skills of lawyers and the mastery of deceivers of all stripes that grows up alongside and inside an ancient and developed culture. Wilson could not have been more in the home of self-deceit, or been surrounded by a more ready and fertile hive of panderers to those who deceive themselves. The Witches of Paris indeed! The height of the Western culture of the age, and an age of sophistry at that, had sharpened the skills of the “sophister” to such acuity…well in any case it was effective, and its long term effect was to ensure that the City of Paris was trampled by the coarse boots of vengeful Germans after barely twenty years. German pride was scourged by the first World War, concluding with the Treaty of Versailles. French pride was scourged by the second World War, begun by the same treaty, the work of French pride.

But there was a peculiar quality that made this outcome sure, one that would not have been present had the others convinced Wilson to scourge Germany with some means other than the lie that it was entirely consistent with the Fourteen Points. What I mean to say is that, had the means of converting the president into a believer in the French proposals and their harsh treatment of Germany been more frank and honest, it may not have had such tragic consequences. A cruelty done with the belief that it is a kindness is a more immoderate thing than a mere indulgence in cruelty. Look at Keynes’ description of how Wilson received Germany’s inevitable objection to the harshness of the final terms:

At last the work was finished; and the President’s conscience was still intact. In spite of everything, I believe that his temperament allowed him to leave Paris a really sincere man; and it is probable that to this day he is genuinely convinced that the Treaty contains practically nothing inconsistent with his former professions.

But the work was too complete, and to this was due the last tragic episode of the drama. The reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau inevitably took the line that Germany had laid down her arms on the basis of certain assurances, and that the Treaty in many particulars was not consistent with these assurances. But this was exactly what the President could not admit; in the sweat of solitary contemplation and with prayers to God he had done nothing that was not just and right; for the President to admit that the German reply had force in it was to destroy his self-respect and to disrupt the inner equipoise of his soul; and every instinct of his stubborn nature rose in self-protection. In the language of medical psychology, to suggest to the President that the Treaty was an abandonment of his professions was to touch on the raw a Freudian complex. It was a subject intolerable to discuss, and every subconscious instinct plotted to defeat its further exploration.

Wilson, according to Keynes, could not look back at his conduct during the conference and face the possibility that he had really abandoned his principles, which was by this time the most glaring reality of the whole drama. But of course how could he face such a thing? He had not been induced to believe that the Fourteen Points had to be abandoned; such a conviction was probably impossible. He had not surrendered to the notion that Germany was too dangerous to be trusted and had to be dealt with harshly, or that she was a deceiver herself and it served her right to be deceived. But he had allowed identical damage to be done through greatly assisted self-deception that he was still holding his sacred position. He could have admitted the error of the other courses, but he could not admit that he had really broken faith. Thus in the final hours, it was found that Wilson’s position could not be reversed or even moderated, because to do so would have involved a terrible admission of guilt by the President. He is prevented from doing what is right by the mere fear of knowing that he has already done wrong. There is a chapter in Chesterton’s book on Eugenics entitled “The Impotence Of Impenitence,” and the phrase fits Wilson’s error neatly. But it fits better the whole age; Chesterton might well have been unaware of the specific role of this sin in the formation of the Treaty, but he describes the world in 1922 as if he were describing the man who tried to save it in 1919:

This strange, weak obstinacy, this persistence in the wrong path of progress, grows weaker and worse, as do all such weak things. And by the time in which I write its moral attitude has taken on something of the sinister and even the horrible. Our mistakes have become our secrets. Editors and journalists tear up with a guilty air all that reminds them of the party promises unfulfilled, or the party ideals reproaching them. It is true of our statesmen (much more than of our bishops, of whom Mr. Wells said it), that socially in evidence they are intellectually in hiding. The society is heavy with unconfessed sins; its mind is sore and silent with painful subjects; it has a constipation of conscience. There are many things it has done and allowed to be done which it does not really dare to think about; it calls them by other names and tries to talk itself into faith in a false past, as men make up the things they would have said in a quarrel.